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Constitutional Difficulties of Utah’s 
Executive Branch and the Need for Reform
By John J. Flynn*
I .  I n t r o d u c t io n
Utah’s constitution of 1896 has been aptly described as a “horse and 
buggy” constitution. Like most of her sister states, Utah adopted a constitu­
tion designed to accommodate a society accustomed to the nineteenth century 
pace of a horse and buggy at the very time that the industrial revolution was 
laying the foundation for a vastly different type of society.1
The horse and buggy description of Utah’s constitution is more than 
justified when one studies the process of drafting and adopting the article 
on the executive branch. The constitutional convention appointed a fifteen 
member committee to make the initial draft of an executive article.2 Few of 
the great issues of governmental theory and the executive branch of govern­
ment were debated when the committee’s draft was considered by the full 
convention. No one questioned the wisdom of creating six elective offices 
in the executive branch.3 There was no debate on the question of succession 
in case of the death or disability of the governor;4 nor was debate held upon 
the scope of the governor’s, or any of the other elective executive officers’ 
duties and powers.5 There was no debate on the purposes and powers of the 
boards and commissions created by the constitution6 with the exception of 
the Board of Pardons.7 And, one is struck by the absence of debate upon the 
governor’s appointive power or the constitutional creation of a Board of 
Examiners. Little debate was held on the governor’s veto power,8 qualifica­
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Utah.
1See generally G r a v e s ,  A m e r i c a n  S t a t e  G o v e r n m e n t  64-68 (4th ed. 1953).
a 1 P r o c e e d i n g s  o f  t h e  U t a h  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o n v e n t i o n  1895, at 66 (1898) 
[hereinafter cited as C o n v e n t i o n  P r o c e e d i n g s ] .
3 U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. VII, § 1 (governor, secretary of state, attorney general, state 
auditor, state treasurer, and superintendent of public instruction). The office of 
superintendent of public instruction was made appointive by an amendment to article 
VII, § 1, adopted in 1950. The office remained a constitutional office, however, 
under article VII, § 19. See State Bd. of Educ. v. Commission of Fin., 122 Utah 164, 
247 P.2d 435 (1952).
* U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. VII, § 1 1 ,  establishes a line of succession. There was some 
debate about the creation of an office  ^of lieutenant governor, 1 C o n v e n t i o n  P r o ­
c e e d i n g s  653, but the proposal was rejected, id. at 656, on the grounds that a lieu­
tenant governor would have little to do and that compensating an elective officer for 
doing nothing would be a waste of tax revenue.
“There was some debate on the scope of the attorney^general’s duties during the 
debate on the proper salary for that office. The convention seemed to believe there 
would be little labor required of the attorney general; the prestige of the office would 
bring sufficient extra compensation by enhancing the reputation of the practitioner 
elected, and $1500 per annum was sufficient compensation for giving advice to state 
officers from time to time. 2 id. at 1027.
e E.g., U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. VII, § 13 (State Prison Commissioners and Board of 
Examiners) ; id. § 14 (Insane Asylum Commissioners) ; id. § 15 (Reform School 
Commissioners).
7 Id . § 12; see 1 C o n v e n t i o n  P r o c e e d i n g s  667; 2 id. at 1006.
“ U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. VII, § 8; 2 C o n v e n t i o n  P r o c e e d i n g s  1161-62.
351
HeinOnline -- 1966 Utah L. Rev. 351 1966
352 UTAH LAW REVIEW [ 1966: 351
tions for election to offices in the executive branch9 and the governor’s power 
to call special sessions of the legislature.10 Considerable time, however, was 
spent debating the salaries for elected officers of the executive branch ori­
ginally set by article VII, section 20.11 The controversy did not center upon 
the question of whether salaries should be set by the constitution, but assumed 
the affirmative of that question. The delegates devoted their efforts to 
debating the amount of compensation each elective officer should receive. 
The consensus of the convention on salaries, and perhaps a significant indi­
cation of the convention’s philosophy of the function of state government, 
was voiced by Delegate Varian when he observed: "when the State gov­
ernment goes into operation . . . fully one-half the time of . . . State officers 
will be unemployed.” 12 The delegate from San Juan County compared 
the state auditor’s function and therefore the auditor’s compensation, to 
that of a “good overseer or foreman of our cattle companies” and favored 
a proposal to set the auditor’s pay at about the same level as that of a 
foreman in a San Juan County cattle company.13
The proceedings of the constitutional convention do not evidence serious 
thought by the delegates of the purpose, function and structure of an 
executive branch of state government. Although there is no record of the 
deliberations of the convention’s committee on the executive branch which 
might indicate the source of the committee’s draft, the executive article as 
finally adopted followed the broad outlines of Utah’s pre-statehood constitu­
tions of 1872, 1882, and 1888. Similarities between the final draft of Utah’s 
executive article and the executive articles of the Nevada14 and Washing­
ton15 constitutions seem to indicate that special reliance was placed on 
those constitutions by the drafting committee.
The executive article called for the election of six officers: governor, 
secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, attorney general and 
superintendent of public instruction.16 By a 1950 amendment, the office 
of superintendent of public instruction was made an appointive rather than 
an elective office, even though the office retained the status of a constitu­
tional office under article VII, section 19, and article X, section 8.17 Age,
9 1 id. a t  6 5 6 —65.
“ U t a h  C o n s t , a r t .  VII, § 6 ;  1 C o n v e n t io n  P r o c e e d in g s  6 6 3 .
11 Article VII, § 20, was amended in 1946 to give the legislature power to set 
executive branch salaries for elective officials. Article VI, § 9, still freezes legislator 
pay into the constitution. A constitutional amendment proposed by the Legislative 
Study Commission and passed by the Second Special Session of the Thirty-sixth Legis­
lature would amend article VI, § 9, to increase legislator pay and give the legislature 
power to set legislator pay by law. The amendment will be voted on in November of 
1966. See S.J. Res. 4, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 15, at 25.
12 2 C o n v e n t i o n  P r o c e e d i n g s  1016.
13 Id. at 1023.
“ N e v . C o n s t ,  art. V.
“ W a s h .  C o n s t ,  art. III.
“ U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. VII, § 1. The Washington constitution provides for an 
additional officer, the lieutenant governor. W a s h .  C o n s t ,  art. I l l ,  § 1. But identity 
of language seems to indicate that article VII, § 1, of the Utah constitution was 
copied from the Washington constitution.
17 State Bd. of Educ. v. Commission of Fin., 122 Utah 164, 247 P.2d 435 (1952).
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residence and dual office holding qualifications are constitutionally prescribed 
for all elective executive officers18 and the attorney general is required to 
have been admitted to practice before the supreme court of the state and to 
be in good standing "at the bar at the time of his election.” 19 The state 
auditor and treasurer are “ineligible to election as their own successors.” 20 
The office of governor has several constitutional powers and duties con­
ferred upon it. Article VTI, section 5, which has never been interpreted by 
the courts but has been “defined” by the legislature,21 vests power in the 
governor to: (1) see that the laws are faithfully executed • (2) transact all 
executive business with the officers of the government; (3) require informa­
tion in writing from the officers of the executive department and officers 
and managers of state institutions; and (4) appoint a committee to inves­
tigate and report to him upon the condition of any executive office or state 
institution when the legislature is not in session. Other sections of the 
constitution make the governor commander-in-chief of the state military 
forces;22 vest the governor with the sole power of calling a special session 
of the legislature and defining its agenda;23 grant the governor a limited 
power of appointment24 and a general veto power over every "bill” passed 
by the legislature, with an item veto on bills containing “several items of 
appropriations of money.” 25
The duties of the other elective officers of the executive branch are less 
well defined by the constitution.26 It seems clear, however, that the creation 
of independently elected officers of the executive branch was intended to 
confer some exclusive prerogatives and functions upon those offices. The 
constitutional standard for determining those functions, however, is exces­
sively vague. For example, the attorney general’s constitutional function is
18 U t a h  C o n s t ,  a r t .  VII, § 3.
™ Ibid.
“ Ibid. A proposed constitutional amendment to be voted on in November of 1966 
would permit the auditor and treasurer to succeed themselves once. S.J. Res. 14, Utah 
Laws 1965, at 675. Aside from the question of whether the auditor and treasurer 
should be elective offices in the first place, the proposed amendment seems to be a 
timid step with little merit. The auditor and treasurer can still engage in the game 
of trading offices as they have done since 1936. The amendment only means they must 
change offices every eight years instead of every four years. Since 1936, five treasurers 
have been elected auditors at the end of their terms and three auditors have been 
elected treasurers at the end of their terms. The auditor has often been auditing the 
books he kept as treasurer. If these offices are to be elective, professional qualifica­
tions to run for the office should be required rather than limitations upon t ie  number 
of times a candidate can run for the same office. See T h i r t y - s i x t h :  L e g i s l a t u r e ,  
R e p o r t  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n  o n  t h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  B r a n c h  o f  
G o v e r n m e n t  254 (1966) [hereinafter cited as L i t t l e  H o o v e r  G o m m ’n  R e p o r t ] .
“ U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 67-1-1 to -1-9 (Repl. vol. 1961). The statute defining the 
governor’s power has never been interpreted by the courts either.
“ U t a h  C o n s t ,  a r t .  VII, § 4 .
33 Id . § 6.
u Id . §§ 9, 10.
33 Id . § 8.
56 Secretary o f State: Id. § 16. S ee  a lso  U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  §§ 67-2-1 to  -2-11 
(Repl. v o l. 1961), a s  a m e n d e d ,  U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 67-2-5 ( S u p p .  1965). A u d i to r :  
U t a h  C o n s t ,  a r t .  VII, § 17. S e e  a ls o  U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 67-3-1 (Repl. v o l. 1961). 
T r e a s u r e r :  U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. VII, § 17. A tto rn e y  G e n e r a l :  Id. a r t .  VII § 18. 
S e e  a ls o  U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 67-5-1 (Repl. v o l. 1961). 1
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defined as being “the legal advisor of the State Officers. . . Aside from 
the difficulty caused by creating a constitutionally required attomey-client 
relationship, even where the client and attorney are of different political 
suasion, the constitutional definition is vague. What is meant by “legal 
advisor”? Who or what are “Officers”? Who or what are “State Officers”?27
The constitution also creates several boards and commissions within the 
executive branch and places various combinations of the governor and other 
elective executive branch officers on the boards and commissions.28 With the 
exception of the “Board of Examiners,” 29 all of these constitutionally created 
commissions and boards may be made nonconstitutional bodies by legislative 
act, since the convention modified each section creating them by the lan­
guage, “until otherwise provided by law.” 30 The legislature has “otherwise 
provided by law” and, with the exception of the board of examiners, the 
constitutionally required membership of elective executive branch officers 
on several boards and commissions is no longer required.31 In effect, sections
12 to 15, with the exception of the board of examiners provision in section
13 of article VII, have been removed from the constitution by legislation.
While a superficial examination of the executive article and statutes
passed pursuant to it seems to indicate that the drafters of Utah’s constitu­
tion created a strong chief executive, executive power has been undermined 
by several factors. Earmarking of tax revenue has made several executive 
agencies immune from the powerful weapon of budgetary control.32 Consti­
tutional restrictions upon debt limits and tax resources severely limit
” Some of these questions may be answered by a suit filed by the Attorney General 
testing the constitutionality of legislation creating the office of Legal Advisor to the 
Legislature. S.B. 4, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 7, at 11. The Attorney 
General claims the legislation violates the constitutional prerogatives of the office of 
Attorney General as legal advisor to “State Officers.” U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. VII, § 18. 
The suit is pending.
24Id . § 12 (Board of Pardons); id. § 13 (Board of Examiners); ibid. (State Prison
Commission); id. § 14 (Insane Asylum Commission); id. § 15 (Reform School 
Commission).
29 In Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958), the
Utah Supreme Court refused to read into the second sentence of article VII, § 13,
the "until otherwise provided by law” provision of the first sentence. Consequently the 
state prison commission, created in the first sentence of article VII, § 13, may be
changed by legislative act, while the board of examiners, created by the second sen­
tence of article VII, § 13, may not be changed by legislative act.
30 What little debate was held upon inserting the words “until otherwise provided 
by law,” seems to imply that the convention intended all of the constitutionally created 
boards and commissions created by article VII, §§ 12—15, to be subject to legislative 
act. See 2 C o n v e n t i o n  P r o c e e d i n g s  1152-53.
31 See U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 64-6-2 (Repl. vol. 1961) (Reform School Commission’s 
duties assigned to State Department of Public Welfare); U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  §§ 64-7-1, 
-2 (Repl. vol. 1961) (insane asylum duties assigned to State Department of Public 
Welfare) ; U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 64-9-2 (Supp. 1965) (State Prison Commission’s 
duties assigned to Board of Correction); U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 77-62-2 (1953) (Board 
of Pardons).
“ U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. XIII, § 3 (income taxes and taxes on intangible property 
earmarked for support of the public school system); id. § 7 (limits source of state 
funds to support public schools to a maximum of 75% derived from property taxes); 
id. § 13 (license tax, registration fees, driver education tax, other charges related to 
the operation of motor vehicles on public highways and the proceeds of excise taxes 
on motor fuels earmarked for highway purposes).
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necessary flexibility in a governor’s fiscal program.33 And, a host of other 
latent and unnecessary constitutional restrictions lie in wait to trap the 
state’s chief executive in the fulfillment of the governmental responsibilities 
expected to be performed by a state governor in the twentieth century.
Perhaps the most fundamental barriers to the effective exercise of guber­
natorial responsibility in Utah, warranting deeper analysis, are: The elective 
status of numerous executive branch officials; the board of examiners; and 
the proliferation of boards and commissions to the point of destroying intelli­
gent comprehension of their status and functions and rendering intelli­
gent control and management of executive branch agencies impossible. It is 
the purpose of this article to examine these difficulties in light of article VII 
of the Utah constitution, the executive article.
II. E l e c t i v e  E x e c u t i v e  B r a n c h  O f f i c i a l s
The Utah Constitution of 1896, like so many other state constitutions of 
the late nineteenth century, carried the principal of “checks and balances” 
to a logical extreme. The constitutional convention not only established 
rigid external checks and balances,34 but extended the theory to include 
numerous internal checks and balances. Executive power was fragmented 
over several elective officials and the legislature was empowered to confer 
further powers and duties upon these officials by law. The legislature has 
exercised that power liberally. For example, the constitutionally independent 
attorney general is, or recently has been, a member of eight boards and 
commissions,35 is counsel for or represents some twelve state boards, agencies, 
or commissions,36 represents the state and its agencies in actions brought by or 
against the state,37 and has general supervisory powers over district or county 
attorneys.38 Politically independent executive offices fragment gubernatorial 
control, render fulfillment of gubernatorial responsibility subject to the con­
trol of other elective officers, and make fair and intelligent citizen assessment
10 See generally id. arts. XIII, XIV.
34 Id . a r t .  V .
“ Board of Examiners, U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. VII, § 13; Board of Canvassers, U t a h  
C o d e  A n n .  § 20-8-10 (1953); Traffic and Safety Co-ordinating Committee, U t a h  
C o d e  A n n .  § 41-14-2 (Repl. vol. 1960); State Council of Defense, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  
§ 63-5-2 (Repl. vol. 1961); State Records Committee, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 63-27-9 
(Repl. vol. 1961); School Employee’s Retirement Board, Utah Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 
1953, ch. 20, § 4; Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, Utah Laws 
1st Spec. Sess. 1941, ch. 8, § 1 at 16; Board of the School for the Deaf, Utah Laws 
1911, ch. 98, §1, at 138.
“ Trade Commission, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 13-2-17 (Repl. vol. 1962); Health 
Department, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 26-15-80 (Supp. 1965); State Road Commission, 
U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 27-12-13 (Supp. 1965); Insurance Commissioner, U t a h  C o d e  
A n n .  § 31-28-18 (Repl. vol. 1966); Industrial Commission, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 35­
1-101 (Repl. vol. 1966); State Insurance Fund, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 35-3-20 (Repl. 
vol. 1966); Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 40-6-3 (Repl. 
vol. 1960); Auto Dealer’s Administrator and Advisory Board, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 
41-3-11 (Repl. vol. 1960); Public Utility Commission, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 54-7-21 
(Repl. vol. 1963); State Building Board, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 63-10-8 (Repl. vol. 
1961); State Engineer, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 73-2-13 (Repl. vol. 1961); State Water 
and Power Board, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 73-10-11 (Repl. vol. 1961).
37 U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 67-5-1 (Repl. v o l. 1961); U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 78-11-9 
(1953).
“ U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 67-5-1 (Repl. vol. 1961).
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of executive branch responsibility impossible.39 I t is therefore not unusual that 
most modern state constitutions/0 the Model State Constitution/1 and state 
executive reorganization studies42 eliminate or suggest elimination of 
numerous elective officials.
However, as the following table illustrates, most state executive branches 
suffer under a similar constitutional handicap of the “long ballot” and a 
divided executive branch.
TABLE 1
M e t h o d  o f  S e l e c t i n g  M a j o r  S t a t e  O f f i c i a l s 48
Supt. of
Lt. Sec. of A tty. Treas- Public
Governor Governor State Gen. urer Auditor Instruct.
Alabama C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E.
Alaska C. E. None C. E. G. B. L. A. G. B.
Arizona C. E. None C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E.
Arkansas C. E. C. E. c.E. C. E. C. E. C. E. D. B.
California C. E. C. E. c.E. C. E. c.E. C. E.
Colorado C. E. C. E. c.E. C. E. C. E. C. E. D. B.
Connecticut C. E. C. E. c.E. C. E. C. E. S.L. D. B.
Delaware C. E. C. E. G. S. C. E. c.E. c.E. D. B.
Florida C. E. None C. E. C. E. C. E. G. S. C. E.
Georgia C. E. C. E. c.E. C. E. C. E. S. L. C. E.
39 See generally G r a v e s ,  op. cit. supra note 1, at 317—61; L a m b e r t ,  “ T h e  E x e c u ­
t i v e  A r t i c l e "  i n  S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e v i s i o n  194 (Graves ed. 1960); R i c h ,  
S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s :  T h e  G o v e r n o r  13-14 (1960).
*° See, e.g., A l a s k a  C o n s t ,  art. I l l  (governor and secretary of state elective); 
H a w a i i  C o n s t ,  art. IV (governor and lieutenant governor elective). The Michigan 
Constitution of 1964 provides for four elective executive branch officers: the governor, 
lieutenant governor, secretary of state, and attorney general. Division of executive 
power is mitigated, to some degree, by the requirement that candidates for the offices 
of governor and lieutenant governor run, and be elected, as a ticket. M i c h .  C o n s t .  
art. V} § 21.
a  N a t i o n a l  M u n i c i p a l  L e a g u e ,  M o d e l  S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  9—12 (only the 
governor is popularly elected).
“ See, e.g., H e a d y ,  S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s :  T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
9-12 (1961); L i t t l e  H o o v e r  C o m m ’n  R e p o r t  253-56. For a detailed study of the 
long ballot see C h i l d s ,  C iv ic  V i c t o r i e s  3-79 (1952).
43 Key: C.E., Constitutional Office, popularly elected;
C.L., Constitutional Office, elected by the legislature;
D.B., Appointed by Departmental Board;
G., Appointed by the Governor;
G.B., Governor appoints, approval by both houses;
G.C., Governor appoints, approval by Council;
G.S., Governor appoints, Senate confirms;
L., Legislature appoints;
L.A., Legislative Auditor;
S.C., Appointed by judges of Supreme Court;
S.E., Statutory office, popularly elected;
S.L., Statutory office, elected by legislature;
—, No information available;
+ ,  Function belongs to another administrative official.
Source: Prepared from information found in C o u n c i l  o f  S t a t e  G o v e r n m e n t s ,  
T h e  B o o k  o f  t h e  S t a t e s ,  1966-1967, at 138 (1966).
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TABLE 1 continued 
M e t h o d  o f  S e l e c t i n g  M a j o r  S t a t e  O f f i c i a l s
Supt. of
L t. Sec. of A tty. Treas- Public
Governor Governor State Gen. urer Auditor Instruct.
Hawaii C. E. C. E. None G. s. C. L. D. B.
Idaho C..E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E.
Illinois c.E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E. c. e. C. E.
Indiana c., E. C. E. c.E. S. E. c.E. C. E. C. E.
Iowa c.. E. C. E. c.E. c., E. C.. E. c. e. G.. S.
Kansas c.E. C. E. c.E. a E. c.E. C. E.
Kentucky c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. c.E. C. E. C. E.
Louisiana c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. c.E. S. L. C. E.
Maine c.E. C. E. c.L. c.L. c.L. S. L. D. B.
Maryland c.E. C. E. G,, S. c., E. L. G. D. B.
Massachusetts c.E. C. E. C. E. c.E. C. E. C. E. D. B.
Michigan c.E. C. E. C. E. c.E. G. S. L. A. D. B.
Minnesota c.E. C. E. C. E. c.E. C. E. C. E. D. B.
Mississippi c.E. C. E. C. E. c.E. C. E. C. E. C. E.
Missouri c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. C. E. C. E. D. B.
Montana c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. c.E. C. E. C. E.
Nebraska c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. c.E. C. E. D. B.
Nevada c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. c.E. L. A. D. B.
New Hampshire c.E. None c.L. G. C. c.L. None D. B.
New Jersey c.E. None G. S. G. S. G. S. C. L. G. S.
New Mexico c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. C. E. c. e. D. B.
New York c.E. C. E. G. S. C. E. + S. L.
North Carolina c.E. C. E. c.E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E.
North Dakota c.E. C. E. c.E. C. E. C. E. C. E. C. E.
Ohio c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. C. E. c. e. D. B.
Oklahoma c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. C. E. c. e. C. E.
Oregon c.E. None c.E. s.E. C. E. — C. E.
Pennsylvania c.E. C. E. G. S. G. S. c.E. c. e. G. S.
Rhode Island c.E. C. E. c.E. C. E. c.E. + D. B.
South Carolina c.E. C. E. c.E. C. E. c.E. D. B. C. E.
South Dakota c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. c.E. C. E. C. E.
Tennessee c.E. C. L. c.L. s.C. c.L. None Gr.
Texas c.E. C. E. G.S. c.E. c.E. L. D. B.
Utah c.E. None c.E. c.E. c.E. C. E. D. B.
Vermont c.E. C. E. c.E. c.E. c.E. C. E. G. S.
Virginia c.E. C. E. G. B. a E. G. B. c. l . G. B.
Washington c.E. a e. c.E. a E. C. E. C. E. C. E.
West Virginia c.E. None c.E. c.E. c.E. G. E. D. B.
Wisconsin c.E. a e. c.E. a E. c.E. G. S. C. E.
Wyoming c.E. None c.E. G. S. c.E. c. e. C. E.
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The office of secretary of state is a constitutional office in 42 states and in 
39 states the occupant of the office is popularly elected.44 As the table indi­
cates, similar practices exist with regard to the offices of attorney general, 
auditor, treasurer, and superintendent of public instruction. The long ballot 
causing voter confusion and inattention, destruction of executive power by 
creating several independently elected or appointed executive officers, and 
the proliferation of state bureaucracy caused by legislation assigning different 
responsibilities to independent executive officers are common problems to 
almost all of our states. As will be illustrated later, Utah has not escaped 
the governmental vices caused by numerous constitutionally elective offices. 
A primary concern of any constitutional convention in Utah will be the 
elimination of the elective offices of secretary of state, attorney general, state 
treasurer, and state auditor and the establishment of the elective office of 
lieutenant or assistant governor to provide for an orderly line of succession 
in case of the death or disability of the governor.45
III. T h e  B o a r d  o f  E x a m i n e r s
While efficient and responsible executive power in Utah is fractionalized 
by the independent election of several constitutionally created executive 
offices, gubernatorial power is pulverized by the board of examiners. The 
board is a constitutional body created by article VII, section 13, of the 
Utah constitution:
They [governor, secretary of state, and attorney general] shall, also 
constitute a Board of Examiners, with power to examine all claims 
against the State except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by 
law, and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law; and 
no claim against the State, except for salaries and compensation of 
officers fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the Legislature with­
out having been considered and acted upon by the said Board of 
Examiners.
Although the constitutional provision creating the board of examiners 
seems designed for the purpose of creating an administrative body to resolve 
tort claims against the sovereign46 or as a body designed to perform per­
functory post-auditing tasks, the Utah Board of Examiners has grown into a 
governmental troika completely dominating the executive branch.47
44 In Maine, New Hampshire, and Tennessee, the legislature elects the secretary of 
state.
45 Article VII, § 11, of the Utah constitution establishes a line of succession upon 
the death, impeachment, removal, disability, resignation, or absence of the governor. 
The order of succession is secretary of state and president pro tempore of the senate. 
There are several difficulties with article VII, § 11. It provides no means for deter­
mining disability; it seems to establish an exclusive line of succession; and no provision 
is made for succession in case the governor-elect is incapacitated prior to inauguration. 
The Model State Constitution seems to cover most of these contingencies. N a t i o n a l  
M u n i c i p a l  L e a g u e ,  M o d e l  S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  § 5.08 (6th ed. 1963).
48 Note, 68 H arv. L. R ev. 506,507 (1955).
47 See Note, The Utah Board of Examiners, 5 U t a h  L . R e v .  349 (1956). In recent 
years the Utah Supreme Court has continued to expand the board’s constitutional 
powers. See Toronto v. Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 403, 393 P.2d 795 (1964): Bateman v. 
Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958); University of Utah v. Board
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The constitutional history of the board of examiner’s provision is skimpy 
at best. The drafters of the constitution apparently attached no significance 
to the provision, since there was little debate on the subject.48 I t seems 
evident that the concept of a board of examiners, found only in the Idaho,49 
Montana,50 Nevada,51 and Utah constitutions,52 was simply copied with 
little debate from the 1872 version of the Utah constitution drafted during 
the struggle for statehood.53 The drafters of the 1872 Utah constitution, in 
turn, copied the board of examiners provision from the Nevada constitution 
of 1864.54 While the Idaho, Montana, and Nevada courts have restricted 
the power of their boards of examiners, principally by limiting their boards’ 
power to passing upon unliquidated claims against the state,55 the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Utah Legislature have vested the Utah board with
of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348 (1956). The only decision adverse to the 
powers of the board during the past ten years was Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 
374 P.2d 516 (1962). The court held that the attorney general was required to pay 
monies appropriated by the legislature for a tort claimant despite a recommendation 
by the board of examiners to the legislature that the claim not be paid. The board 
had “passed upon” the claim and the legislature was not bound by the board’s decision.
“ See 1 C o n v e n t io n  P r o c e e d in g s  933; 2 id. at 1015, 1016.
43 I d a h o  C o n s t ,  art. IV, § 18.
“ M o n t .  C o n s t ,  a r t .  VII, § 2 0 .
B1 N e v .  C o n s t ,  art. V, § 21.
“ Michigan’s Constitutions of 1908, article VI, § 20, and 1850, article VIII, § 4, 
created a board of state auditors with similar powers to those vested in boards of 
examiners in Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah. The title used by these earlier 
Michigan constitutions suggests that the power to “examine claims against the State” 
is broader than the “quasi-judicial” function of resolving tort claims against the sover­
eign and includes broad audit powers with regard to all state expenditures. The Utah 
Supreme Court has suggested that the powers of the Utah Board of Examiners go 
“beyond mere auditing.” Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 228, 322 P.2d 
381, 385 (1958). The constitutional and statutory powers of Utah’s board seem to 
include passing upon tort claims, audit functions, passing on all state expenditures not 
specifically excepted by article VII, § 13, and inclusive executive power over all execu­
tive and administrative phases of state government See Toronto v. Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 
403, 393 P.2d 795 (1964); U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 63-6-1 to -6-28 (Repl. vol. 1961), as 
amended, U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 63-6-1 to -6-21 (Supp. 1965).
„ “ Constitution of the State of Utah, art. V, § 18 (1872). The board of examiners 
provision was not included in the 1882 or 1887 pre-statehood constitutions of Utah. 
Since there is no record of the deliberations of the committee charged with drafting 
the executive article in Utah’s Constitutional Convention of 1895, it is impossible to 
determine whether article VII, § 12, was copied directly from the Nevada constitution 
or the Utah Constitution of 1872.
“ Article V, § 21, of the Nevada constitution provides:
They [governor, secretary of state, and attorney general] shall also constitute 
a Board of Examiners, with power to examine all claims against the State 
(except salaries or compensation of Officers fixed by law) and perform such 
other duties as may be prescribed by law, and no claim against the State 
(except salaries or compensation of Officers fixed by law) shall be passed upon 
by the Legislature without having been considered and acted upon by said 
“Board of Examiners.”
The Nevada and Utah provisions are practically identical.
55 See Winters v. Romsey, 4  Idaho 303, 39 Pac. 193 (1895); Fitzpatrick v. State Bd. 
of Examiners, 105 Mont. 234, 70 P.2d 285 (1937); State ex rel. Lyon County v. 
Hallock, 20 Nev. 326, 22 Pac. 123 (1889). Compare, State ex rel. Black v. State Bd. 
of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201 (1921), with University of Utah v. Board of 
Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348 (1956); and Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 
93, 369 P.2d 590 (1962), with Campbell BIdg. Co. v. State Road Comm’n, 95 Utah 
242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937); and State ex rel. Dildine v. Collins, 21 Mont. 448, 53 Pac. 
1114 (1898), with University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, supra.
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vast executive and limited legislative and judicial functions s i m i l a r  to the 
powers vested in governors’ councils elsewhere.66
For example, the legislature has delegated power to the board of exam­
iners to make deficit appropriations when the legislature is out of session 
upon unanimous approval by the board.57 This delegation of legislative 
power to the board was no doubt necessitated by the fact that the Utah 
Legislature is out of session approximately ninety per cent of the time every 
biennium.58 The board has broad judicial powers with regard to general 
claims against the state,59 and at one time had sole jurisdiction to review 
decisions of the state bank commissioner with respect to granting bank or 
building and loan charters and permitting existing banks to establish 
branches.60 In effect, the legislature has treated the board as an interim 
legislature and quasi-judicial “super” administrative agency to oversee and 
manage the entire executive branch of the state government as well as a 
judicial body to find facts and make rulings of law.61
The Utah Supreme Court has contributed to the growth of the board’s 
constitutional powers by broadly interpreting the words “claim” and “ex-
“ M e . C o n s t ,  a r t .  V, p t .  2 , § 1 ;  M a s s .  C o n s t ,  ch . II, § III; N .H . C o n s t ,  p t .  II, 
a r t .  6 0 ;  N .C . C o n s t ,  a r t .  I ll ,  § 14.
" U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 63-6-19 (Repl. vol. 1961).
m The legislature is restricted to sixty-day sessions every other year. U ta h  Const. 
art. VI, §§ 2, 16. Special sessions may only be called by the governor, U ta h  Const. 
art. VII, § 6, and are limited to thirty days duration. U ta h  Const, art. VI, § 16. 
The stringent time limitations upon regular legislative sessions when coupled with the 
increase of state governmental activity have caused increased use of the special session 
to the point that special sessions have become a biennial or annual event. From 1896 
to 1940 only seven special sessions were called: January 1896 (to implement the new 
constitution and make the transition from territorial to statehood status); June 1909; 
September 1919; January 1930; January 1933; July 1933; and, August 1936. From 
1940 to July of 1966, Utah’s governors have called thirteen special sessions or approxi­
mately twice as many in half the time: March 1941; May 1941; March 1944; 
August 1946; March 1948; June 1951; June 1952; December 1953; April 1955; 
May 1959; May 1963; January 1966; and, May 1966. Since the governor controls 
the call and agenda of special sessions, State Tax Comm’n v. Preece, 1 Utah 2d 337, 
266 P.2d 757 (1954); State v. Scott, 105 Utah 31, 140 P.2d 929 (1943); and the 
time limits on regular sessions are so ridiculous, one might question whether Utah 
has a legislature in the normal sense of the word or only a rubber stamp to approve 
proposals of the executive branchy and private interest groups. The Thirty-sixth Legis­
lature, at its second special session, proposed several constitutional amendments to 
remedy the situation. See S.J. Res. 1, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 16, at 26 
(permits functioning of interim legislative committees); S.J. Res. 2, Utah Laws 2d 
Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 14, at 24 (provides annual legislative sessions with budget sessions 
in even numbered years and general sessions in odd numbered years); S.J. Res. 3, Utah 
Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 17, at 27 (authorizes legislature, upon petition by two- 
thirds of the membership, to call itself into special session). The proposed amendments 
will be voted on by the electorate at the general election in November 1966.
a  U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  §§ 63-6-10 to -6-17 (Repl. vol. 1961), as amended, U t a h  
C o d e  A n n .  §§ 63-6-11 to -6-17 (Supp. 1965).
60 U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 7-1-26 (1953). Vesting final review of the commissioner’s 
decisions in the board of examiners raised serious due process questions. See Walker 
Bank & Trust C o . v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 592 (1964). A  1963 amend­
ment to U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 7-1-26 (1953) removed the board of examiners from the 
process and substituted judicial review of charter determinations by the commissioner 
U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 7-1-26 (Supp. 1965). '
a For a summary of the board’s powers see Note, The Utah Board of Examiners 
5 U t a h  L. R e v .  349 (1956). The board’s key power is its absolute control over fiscal 
affairs. See Toronto v. Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 403, 393 P.2d 795 (1964). See generally 
S n o w ,  U t a h  B o a r d  o f  E x a m i n e r s :  I t ’s  R o l e  i n  F i s c a l  M a n a g e m e n t  (1962)
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amine” 02 to include all demands upon state funds and plenary power to 
examine into the advisability and necessity of any expenditure or proposed 
obligation of the state.63 The court has always presumed in favor of the 
board’s constitutional powers when called upon to resolve internal conflicts 
between the board and other constitutionally created institutions,64 with 
the possible exception of the state legislature.65 Possible reasons for the 
court’s disposition to continually widen the powers of the board, even at the 
expense of other constitutionally created institutions, is the constitutional 
weakness of the legislative branch and a consequent fear of unchecked 
dictatorial power becoming centered in the governor’s office.66 I t seems fair 
to say, therefore, that the court has utilized the board of examiners pro­
vision to create an internal check upon gubernatorial power in light of the 
relatively weak check on executive branch power offered by a legislature 
hamstrung by outdated procedural and substantive limitations,67 absurd 
time limitations,6® and ridiculous compensation restrictions which cause a 
high rate of membership turnover.69
The judiciary’s unarticulated rationale for frustrating centralized execu­
tive control by creating an executive troika was verbalized by the legislature 
when it was asked by the present Governor to propose a constitutional 
amendment to the voters abolishing the board of examiners. In an unusual 
display of bipartisan protection of the legislature as an independent branch 
of government designed to check executive power, the legislature delayed
°  Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 226, 322 P.2d 381, 384 (1958); 
see Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 Pac. 434 (1931); State ex rel. Davis 
v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720 (1908).
“ Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958).
See ibid. (State Board of Education) ; University of Utah v. Board of Examiners,
4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348 (1956) (University of Utah).
05 In Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962), the court held that 
the legislature could pass a private bill for the payment of a  tort claimant despite 
action by the Board denying the claim. In the area of tort claims the board is the 
legislature’s fact finder and the legislature serves as an appellate tribunal for dissatisfied 
claimants before the board of examiners. U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 63-6-17 (Repl. vol. 
1961). But the legislature is not superior to the board in other areas which have been 
defined as within the constitutional power of the board. For example, the legislature 
cannot circumvent the board’s constitutional power over state expenditures by vesting 
budget control in the governor’s office. Toronto v. Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 403, 405, 393 
P.2d 795, 796 (1964). However, the court’s opinions have not been noticeably succinct 
in defining what is meant by the board’s ‘‘general supervisory power over expenditures 
by the state govemmeitt,” except to befuddle the issue more by saying it is “more 
than a mere auditing function.” Id . at 405, 393 P.2d at 796.
“ In Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958), the 
court observed: “Looking at the problems here presented in broad perspective it is 
important to realize that our legislature has met biennially and in special sessions for 
many years with both the statutory and decisional law of this state being so understood 
and applied that in practical operation the Examiners and Finance have exercised 
general supervisory powers over the fiscal and budgetary affairs of other departments 
of state government. . . .” Id . at 234, 322 P.2d at 390. In Toronto v. Clyde, 15 Utah 
2d 403, 393 P.2d 795 (1964), the court took care to point out the composition of the 
board and that the board members are independently elected and are, therefore, inde­
pendently responsible to the voters. Id . at 405, 393 P.2d at 796.
CT See U t a h  C o n s t ,  art. VI, §§ 22-31.
« Id .  §§ 2,16.
** Id. § 9 ($500 per year, $5 per day, and mileage).
i
HeinOnline -- 1966 Utah L. Rev. 361 1966
362 UTAH LAW REVIEW [ 1966: 351
passage of the board of examiners proposal70 until passage of several pro­
posed constitutional amendments strengthening the legislature was accom­
plished.71 The legislature also passed several bills to increase its staff 
strength72 and a bill designed to enable the legislature to assume duties of 
fiscal management heretofore the constitutional function of the board of 
examiners.73
The proposed constitutional amendment passed by the legislature to 
eliminate the board of examiners,74 does not go beyond simply eliminating 
the constitutional language creating that body. While some confusion may 
be caused by eliminating the board without specifying what happens to
™ H.J. Res. 1, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 18, at 27-28.
” S.J. Res. 1, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 16, at 26 (proposed constitutional 
amendment to allow each house of the legislature to appoint interim committees); 
S.J. Res. 2, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 14, at 24-25 (authorize annual sessions, 
alternating between budget and general sessions, and clarify the word day in article VI, 
§ 16, to mean legislative days rather than calendar days); S.J. Res. 3, Utah Laws 2d 
Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 17, at 27 (authorize the legislature to call itself into special 
session and establish the topics to be considered by a two-thirds vote of the members); 
S.J. Res. 4, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 15, at 25 (increase compensation to 
$1000 per year until “otherwise provided by law”) .
12 S. 2, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 4, at 5—7 (strengthens legislative coun­
cil) ; S. 3, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 6, at 10—11 (creates a joint legislative 
operations committee); S. 4, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 7, at 11—12 (creates a 
joint legal services committee and authorizes the employment of a legal advisor to the 
legislature). The Attorney General has brought suit to test the constitutionality of 
S. 4. The Attorney General has taken the position that employment of a legislative 
legal advisor violates article VII, § 18, of the Utah constitution. Article VII, § 18, 
defines the constitutional duties of the Attorney General as follows: “The Attorney- 
General shall be the legal advisor of the State Officers, and shall perform such other 
duties as may be provided by law.” The version of article VII, § 18, printed in volume 
one of the Utah Code Annotated, page 220, is not correct. The word "officers” is 
capitalized in the official version of the constitution, whereas the code version does not 
capitalize the word “officers.” The distinction may be-crucial in the pending litigation 
since the words “state officers” in capitalized form lend weight to the argument that the 
Attorney General’s constitutional status of “legal advisor to State Officers” applies only 
to the constitutionally enumerated officers of the executive branch. This seems to be 
especially the case in light of the use of the word “officers” elsewhere in article VII 
and the stringent separation of powers provision found in article V, § 1.
” S. 1, Utah Laws, 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 5, at 7-9. The act creates a Joint 
Budget and Audit Committee and authorizes employment of a legislative analyst and 
legislative auditor. The committee’s functions are defined as follows:
To ascertain facts and make recommendations to the legislature concern­
ing: (a) The management, operation, programs, and fiscal needs of the agencies 
and institutions of state government; (b) the executive budget and budget 
requests of each state agency and institution, including proposals for construc­
tion of capital improvements; (c) revenue from existing and proposed taxes and 
other sources; and (d) the State’s fund structure, financial condition, fiscal 
organization, and its budgeting, accounting, reporting, personnel and purchas­
ing procedures. . .
S. 1, § 2, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 5, § 3 (2 ), at 8. Section 7 of the act 
defines the duties of the legislative analyst and § 8 defines the duties of the legislative 
auditor.
The popularly elected state auditor is already charged with the duties of legisla­
tive auditor. U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  § 67-3-1 (Repl. vol. 1961). It seems, however, that 
popular election of the state auditor and inclusion of that office in the executive 
article of the constitution, article VII, § 17, has caused the legislature to consign the 
state auditor to the executive branch in practice if not by law.
71 H.J. Res. 1, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 18, at 27-28.
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the powers heretofore exercised by the board,75 elimination of the board is 
a primary goal to any effort to rehabilitate the executive article of the Utah 
constitution.
As presently constituted, the office of governor is subject to the control 
and judgment of an independently elected secretary of state and attorney 
general in the management of almost all phases of the executive branch. 
Budgetary control, the hiring of high level executive branch personnel, the 
efficient expenditure of appropriated funds, and the important minutiae of 
effective gubernatorial control of subordinates, such as approval of employee 
travel vouchers, are all subject to the veto of officers not elected as the chief 
executive of the state government. Thus, although article VII, section 5, of 
the Utah constitution vests broad responsibilities upon the office of governor, 
the board of examiners provision has undermined the governor’s power to 
fulfill those responsibilities. The net effect of charging the governor with 
great responsibilities while denying a good governor the power to fulfill those 
responsibilities to the best of his ability is the absence of any rational basis 
for voters to make an intelligent assessment of a governor’s performance, 
the creation of a vacuum of power in state executive affairs, and the further 
atrophy of state power in the presence of expanding federal power.
IV. R e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  B r a n c h
The constitutional difficulties of several independently elected executive 
branch officers and the board of examiners are the root causes of the third 
major difficulty of Utah’s executive branch — bureaucratic proliferation of 
executive branch agencies and the consequent need for reorganization. To 
be sure, the problem of executive reorganization to make management and
” Creation of a Utah Legislative Budget and Audit Committee should replace some 
of the board’s fiscal management powers; annual sessions should alleviate the need for 
an executive agency to have “defeat appropriation” powers; and the passage of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, waiving sovereign immunity ( U t a h  C o d e  A n n .  §§ 
63-30-1 to -30-34 (Supp. 1965)), should remove the necessity for an administrative 
tribunal to handle claims against the state. However, there is a serious question as to 
the constitutionality of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, since it attempts to 
circumvent the board of examiners in settling tort claims against the state. The extent 
of legislative power to waive sovereign immunity in light of the board of examiners’ 
powers has never been clearly settled by the courts. While the Utah Supreme Court 
has said in dictum: “We have no constitutional provision inhibiting the legislature 
from waiving immunity from suit,” Campbell BIdg. Co. v. State Road Comm’n, 95 
Utah 242, 251, 70 P.2d 857, 861 (1937), the court has held that the board is a 
“constitutional tribunal” to adjudicate tort claims against the state, Wilkinson v. State, 
42 Utah 483, 134 Pac. 626 (1913), and all “claims against state funds” must be 
“passed upon” by the board, Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 Pac. 434 
(1931) (liquidated bounty claim against special bounty fund). A deeper issue as to the 
constitutionality of the Governmental Immunity Act may be raised if the voters approve 
the constitutional amendment abolishing the board of examiners. _ The immunity act 
went into effect July 1, 1966, and the voters will vote on the examiners amendment in 
November of 1966. Thus, the act may be unconstitutional for five months and its 
“prior condition of servitude” may have no effect after that date. To avoid the issue 
as to claims after the next regular session in January of 1967, the legislature should 
re-enact the immunity act. What solution lies in store for claims arising between 
July 1, 1966 and the abolition of the board can only be described as a “constitutional 
juggernaut.”  ^ ^
In any event, the Thirty-seventh Session of the Utah Legislature must give long 
and careful consideration to the disposition of the board of examiners’ powers in the 
event that the voters approve the constitutional amendment abolishing the board.
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administration of the executive branch efficient and responsible, while 
eliminating duplication, waste, and petty “empire building” is not peculiar 
to Utah’s executive branch. I t has plagued state and federal governments 
in the United States for many years.76 Proliferation and duplication of 
executive branch agencies seems to be a vice of government, only to be 
curbed by periodic reviews with a view toward consolidation and adequate 
constitutional powers to effectuate consolidation.
Utah has had a checkered history of attempts to effect executive reorgan­
ization and curb the tendency to proliferate executive branch agencies. The 
first attempt to stimulate reorganization came in 1921 at the instance of 
Governor Maybey.77 Legislation was passed creating a Utah Department of 
Finance and Purchase, which department had control over the financial 
operations of the state.73 Dissatisfaction with the operation of the depart­
ment brought its demise in 1927. A similar attempt to centralize fiscal 
administration and to centralize tax collection was made in 1930 when the 
voters approved a constitutional amendment creating the state tax com­
mission.79 The amendment created a four member tax commission appointed 
by the governor with the consent of the senate to “administer and supervise 
the tax laws of the State.”80 Prior to that time, responsibility for the admin­
istration of tax laws and the collection of revenue had been widely dis­
persed among several executive officers.31 The tax commission remains as a 
salutary if not overly progressive instance of the executive reorganization 
effort in Utah.
A broader attempt at executive reorganization was made in 1933 for the 
limited purpose of attempting to keep the state budget in balance during the 
Depression.82 Some consolidations were effected, but the greatest contribution 
made by the 1933 effort was the fact that it stimulated interest in the 
creation of a new study committee in 1935. The 1935 general session of the 
legislature created a special committee of nine members charged with the 
broad responsibility of investigating the organization and operation of the 
state and local governmental units of Utah.33 The so-called “Committee of 
Nine” recommended a limited degree of centralized control within the 
existing constitutional framework by suggesting consolidation of major execu­
tive branch functions into departments headed by the elected officers of the
•° See generally A b e r n a t h y , S o m e  P e r s is t in g  Q u e s t i o n s  C o n c e r n in g  t h e  
C o n s t it u t io n a l  S t a t e  E x e c u t iv e  (Univ. Kansas Gov’t Research Series No. 23  
1 9 6 0 ) ;  B u c k , T h e  R e o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  S t a t e  G o v e r n m e n t s  i n  t h e  U n it e d  S t a t e s  
( 1 9 3 8 ) ;  C o u n c il  o f  S t a t e  G o v e r n m e n t s , R e o r g a n iz in g  S t a t e  G o v e r n m e n t s : A  
P o l ic y  S t a t e m e n t  ( 1 9 5 0 ) ;  H e a d y , St a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s : T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  
A d m in is t r a t io n  ( 1 9 6 1 ) ;  W i l l b e r n , A d m in is t r a t io n  i n  S t a t e  G o v e r n m e n t s  
( 1 9 5 5 ) .
" U t a h  F o u n d a t io n , A n a l y s is  o f  t h e  U t a h  L i t t l e  H o o v e r  C o m m is s io n  
R e p o r t  —  P a r t  A  1 4  (1 9 6 6 )  [hereinafter cited as L i t t l e  H o o v e r  R e p o r t  A n a l y s is ].
,s Utah Laws 1921, ch. 127, at 354-59.
“ U t a h  C o n s t , a r t .  XIII, §11.
80 Ibid.
81 L i t t l e  H o o v e r  R e p o r t  A n a l y s is  14.
“ S ee  g e n e ra l ly  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n v e s t i g a t i n g  C o m m i t t e e  o f  U t a h  G o v e r n ­
m e n t a l  U n i t s  ( 1 9 3 3 ) .
“ Utah Laws 1935, ch. 135, at 420.
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executive branch.84 But the 1937 and 1939 regular sessions of the Utah Legis­
lature failed to act upon the extensive recommendations of the “Committee 
of Nine.”
In 1941 Governor Maw took up the cause of governmental reorganiza­
tion, basing his recommendations on the report of the “Committee of Nine.” 
In his message to the Twenty-fourth Legislature, Governor Maw indicated 
four objectionable features of the then existing structure of state admin­
istration:
(1) I t has been the past policy of legislatures to create new depart­
ments and commissions and to provide for their organization without 
malting adequate investigation and without having accurate informa­
tion as to what sort of organization plan will provide the most effi­
ciency; (2) Commissions, departments, and institutions have been 
permitted to grow and expand without appreciable legislative or execu­
tive control or guidance; (3) They have been financed without ade­
quate legislative or executive investigation of their financial needs;
(4) They have been permitted to operate as independent units of 
government without inter-department coordination or proper legisla­
tive or executive supervision.55
To remedy the situation the Governor recommended the elimination of 
“scores of boards, commissions, departments, and other official agencies” ; 
classification of the “State’s activities into as few units as possible” ; and, 
the creation of "an organization to administer each classification.”86 But 
the Governor did not suggest an attack upon the fundamental constitu­
tional impediment to consolidation, reduction of the number of elective 
executive branch officers and abolition of the board of examiners. Instead, 
he suggested a grouping of functions into departments under the direction 
and control of the constitutionally elective officers.87 The legislature imple­
mented many of the Governor’s recommendations to create eleven operating 
departmentsS8and a central fiscal control agency, the finance department,89 
while creating several new agencies.00
M For the committee’s general report see 4  S t a t e  o f  U t a h ,  P u b l i c  D o c u m e n t s ,  
32 (1934-36). See also L i t t l e  H o o v e r  R e p o r t  A n a l y s i s  15.
83 Governor’s Message to the Twenty-fourth Session, S e n a t e  J o u r n a l  23, 26 
(1941).
* ld .  at 31.
81 Ibid.
83 The Governor recommended the creation of: Department of Engineering; 
Department of Public Welfare; Department of Lands and Water; Department of
Service and Inspection; Department of Health; Department of Publicity and Industrial 
Development; and a Department of Higher Education. The Governor recommended
realignment of the Tax Commission, Industrial Commission, and Liquor Commission. 
Id. at 32-36.
a Id . at 32.
“ The regular and first special session of the Twenty-fourth Legislature created:
The Department of Health, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 30, at 43-45; Public Welfare Com­
mission, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 66, at 154—56; Department of Publicity and Industrial 
Development, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 75, at 174-78; Aeronautics Commission, Utah 
Laws 1941, ch. 2, at 4; State Building Board, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 4, at 7—9; Depart­
ment of Business Regulation, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 5, at 10-12; Department of Engi­
neering, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 9, at 17-19; Department of Finance, Utah Laws 1941, 
ch. 10, at 20-26; Department of Fish and Game, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 11, at 27—37; 
State Road Commission, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 13, at 39-41; Industrial Commission,
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The 1941 reorganization achieved little consolidation, even by the 
creation of the finance commission91 since the newly created departments 
were headed by three member commissions, new departments were headed 
by constitutionally elective, and therefore independent, executive officers 
and the finance commission never achieved its full potential as regulator of 
fiscal policy because of the constitutional powers of the board of examiners.92
During the succeeding twenty-five years sporadic attempts were made at 
reorganization; while at the same time, the legislature created additional 
boards and commissions at every regular session.93 By 1965 it became appar­
ent that the proliferation and duplication of executive agencies had again 
reached crisis proportions and had made the executive branch unmanage­
able. The Thirty-sixth Legislature followed in the footsteps of the Twenty- 
fourth and created a twelve member “Commission on the Organization of 
the Executive Branch of the Government,” which subsequently became 
known as the “Little Hoover Commission.” 94 Extensive majority05 and 
minority98 reports were issued. While a detailed critique of these reports is 
not possible here, a general comment is in order.
The Little Hoover Commission found that the executive branch con­
sisted of a total of 156 "separate officials, departments, boards, commissions, 
councils, and committees.”97 The commission found the executive branch 
unmanageable, particularly because of the “overwhelming reliance placed in
Utah Laws 1941, ch. 15, at 43-46; Liquor Control Commission, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 
20, at 55-57; Loan Commision, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 21, at 58; Public Service Com­
mission, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 23, at 61-62; Department of Registration, Utah Laws 
1941, ch. 28, at 68-69; State Land Board, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 35, at 76—78; and, 
Securities Commission, Utah Laws 1941, ch. 29, at 70. The Governor called the 
second Special Session of the Twenty-fourth Utah Legislature to consider budget 
matters and the need for consolidation of fiscal management. Governor’s Message to 
the Second Special Session of the Twenty-fourth Legislature, Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 
1941, at 1-6. Aside from appropriating funds for the agencies, commissions and 
departments created by the regular session and the first special session, the Second 
Special Session did nothing to centralize fiscal management. The administrative struc­
ture of the executive branch created by the Twenty-fourth Legislature has remained as 
the basic structure of the executive branch to the present time.
91 L i t t l e  H o o v e r  R e p o r t  A n a l y s i s  16.
95 In 1963 the legislature abolished the three-man finance commission and attempted 
to circumvent the board of examiners by substituting a director of finance responsible 
to the governor. Utah Laws 1963, at 532—42. The Utah Supreme Court struck down 
this attempt to consolidate and centralize budgetary control in the hands of the gov­
ernor as a usurpation of the constitutional powers of the board of examiners. Toronto 
v. Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 403, 393 P.2d 795 (1964).
93 L i t t l e  H o o v e r  R e p o r t  A n a l y s i s  17.
M Utah Laws 1965, ch. 138, at 387-90.
95 L i t t l e  H o o v e r  C o m m ’n  R e p o r t .
“  A  S u p p l e m e n t a l  R e p o r t  t o  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n  o n  t h e  O r g a n ­
iz a t io n  o f  t h e  E x e c u t iv e  B r a n c h  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  (1966) [hereinafter cited 
as M in o r it y  R e p o r t ].
L i t t l e  H o o v e r  C o m m ’n  R e p o r t  2. The breakdown of the agencies by admin­
istrative structure of the agency is as follows: Elected Officials, 5; Elected Boards, 1; 
Major Commissions, Board and Departments, 4 9 ;  Ex officio Boards and Commissions,
1 7 ; State Institutions, 1 5 ; Minor Boards, Commissions, Councils and Agencies, 3 7 ; 
Licensing Boards, Committees, and Councils, 2 8 ; and, Interstate Compact Commissions, 
4 . The breakdown by agency functions is as follows: General Control, 2 0 ;  Education’ 
1 1 ; Natural Resources, 9 ;  Health, 8 ;  Public Safety, 1 0 ; Promotion and Development, 
9 ;  Business Regulation and Commerce, 1 4 ; Licensing Boards, 2 7 ;  and, Welfare 6 Id  
at 2 - 3 .  ’
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the commission or board-form of organization to administer state pro­
grams.” 98 The commission suggested that reliance was placed on this form 
of management out of a  fear of dictatorship," even though its faults are 
obvious. The multimember board or commission form of administrative 
management in U tah results in the governor appointing, nominating or 
approving over five hundred individuals; a  lack of administrative expertise 
among appointees; inefficiency caused by delays inherent in  the committee 
form; the stifling of initiative by staff members due to commission inter­
ference in day to day staff operations; partisanship in administration caused 
by bipartisan appointments to boards and commissions; and, independence 
from and unresponsiveness to gubernatorial control caused by staggered terms 
of commission or board members.100
While many of the fundamental problems with executive branch admin­
istration isolated by the Little Hoover Report have a  familiar echo in 
Governor Maw’s reorganization message to the Twenty-fourth Legislature, 
the remedies do not. The Little Hoover Report recommended, inter alia, 
abolition of the board of examiners,101 abolition of the elective offices of 
secretary of state and establishment of the office of lieutenant governor,102 
changing the status of the office of elective attorney general to that of an 
appointive attorney general,103 changing the elective office of treasurer to 
an appointive office,104 and the abolition of the elective office of auditor and 
the establishment of an office of legislative auditor appointed by the legisla­
ture.105 To offset the loss of a  politically independent attorney general’s 
office with an ability to challenge arbitrary or illegal executive branch 
conduct, the commission recommended the establishment of an “office of 
information and complaints” to review citizen complaints.106 While appar­
ently modeled upon the Scandinavian concept of the ombudsman,107 the 
commission’s concept of the office of information and complaints does not 
seem to take into account the vital judicial function performed by state 
attorneys general in issuing opinions interpreting state law for state agencies. 
Some argument could be made that this facet of the office of attorney 
general should be kept free of gubernatorial control.103
83 O ne hundred and twenty-two o r 80 per cent of the “organizational units”  of the 
executive branch are headed by multimembered boards, commissions, councils or 
committees. Id. a t  5.
“  Ibid.
lco Id . a t  5 -6 .
101 Id . a t  22-24.
102 Id . a t  12-14.
™ Id. a t  72.
™ Id. a t  81.
103 Id . a t  253-55.
™ Id. a t  14.
101 See Blix, A Pattern of Effective Protection: The Ombudsman, 11 How. L.J. 386
(1965); Gellhom, Finland’s Official Watchmen, 114 U . Pa. L. Rev. 327 (1966). Gell- 
honij Swedish Justitieombudsman, 75 Yale L .J. 1 (1965).
103 See generally A b e r n a t h y ,  S o m e  P e r s i s t i n g  Q u e s t i o n s  C o n c e r n i n g  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  S t a t e  E x e c u t i v e  32-49 (Univ. of Kansas Gov’t  Research Series No.
23, 1960).
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The commission also recommended consolidation of existing executive 
agencies into eleven “major groups,” seven of which would be “line or 
program groups” 109 and four staff or control groups.110 To prevent future 
proliferation of agencies or disintegration of the suggested groupings, the 
commission recommended a constitutional amendment giving the governor 
reorganization powers subject to legislative veto, a power similar to that 
possessed by the President in management of the executive branch of the 
federal government.111
While some of the Little Hoover Commission’s recommendations seem 
to be poorly thought out112 and while the Minority Report criticized the 
methods by which the commission carried out its assignment,113 plus the 
absence of alternative recommendations,114 and several of the majority’s spe­
cific recommendations,115 the commission recognized that constitutional diffi­
culties were the causes of executive proliferation and made generally sound 
recommendations to effectuate a lasting and meaningful reorganization of the 
executive branch. Lest the history of U tah’s 1941 reorganization attempt 
repeat itself, however, it seems imperative that three fundamental constitu­
tional changes recommended by the Little Hoover Commission Report be 
made. (1 )  Abolish the elective offices of secretary of state, attorney general, 
auditor, and treasurer and establish the office of lieutenant governor 
or assistant governor.116 Without this constitutional reform executive power 
will continue to be fractionalized and the legislative tendency, evidenced by 
the 1941 reorganization, to create independent agencies to meet specific 
needs and assign control of the institution created to constitutionally elective 
officers will repeat itself. (2) Abolish the board of examiners. Without this 
constitutional reform centralized control of budget and fiscal management 
will be frustrated. (3) Vest reorganization power subject to legislative veto 
in the office of governor. W ithout this reform, proliferation will begin
109 Public Safety Services; Transportation Services; H ealth and Welfare Services; 
H igher Education; Public Education; Natural Resource Services; and, Labor and 
Commerce Services. Little H o o v e r  Comm’n Report 247—48.
110 Budget and Administrative Services; Revenue Services; Legal Services; and, State 
Development Services. Ibid.
111 Id. a t  16. T he M odel State Constitution contains this type of reorganization 
provision. N a t io n a l  M u n i c i p a l  L e a g u e ,  M o d e l  S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  § 5.06 (6th 
ed. 1963).
112 Particularly the suggestion th a t a  five m an court be established to “handle the 
state’s administrative hearing work load.” L i t t l e  H o o v e r  C o m m o n  R e p o r t  257. 
T he suggestion seems to  be based on the fear of arbitrary administrative action, rather 
than a  factual demonstration tha t administrative appeals are burdensome and poorly 
handled by the regular court system. If  there is a  need for reform of administrative 
proceedings, the best reform would be the establishment of a  well trained group of 
hearing examiners.
113 M i n o r i t y  R e p o r t  Hi.
111 Ibid.
11S In  general the minority report took a  m uch less serious view of the present status
of the executive branch. For example the minority report was unwilling to  condemn
the commission form of managem ent and did not subscribe to the view tha t all execu­
tive branch officers should be appointive, w ith the exception of the governor and a 
lieutenant governor.
1,0 I t  has been suggested th a t the office of lieutenant governor can be m ade more 
meaningful if it is called “Assistant Governor.” A b e r n a t h y ,  op. cit. supra note 108, 
a t 24.
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anew and legislative inertia in overhauling existing state agencies will be 
difficult to overcome.
A fourth vital constitutional reform, worthy of consideration and one 
not suggested by the Little Hoover Commission, is a  constitutional provision 
limiting the total number of executive departments exclusive of commissions 
assigned quasi-judicial functions. U tah’s 1941 reorganization and perhaps 
all attempts a t a  major overhaul of any state’s executive branch have faced 
the difficulties of finding a  starting place and the absence of coercion to 
force the necessary accommodations among existing independent agencies, 
boards, and commissions. In  a  very practical, political sense, every agency 
favors total consolidation of every other state agency but itself and almost 
all agencies have sufficient pressure group support desiring agency inde­
pendence to frustrate legislative reorganization. The Model State Consti­
tution offers a well drafted example of such a  provision117 and the states 
of Alaska,118 Hawaii,119 Massachusetts,120 Michigan,121 New Jersey,122 and 
New York123 have had successful experiences with this type of constitutional 
provision. If such a  provision is not adopted in U tah it seems safe to predict 
that the experience of the 1941 reorganization will repeat itself124 and 
twenty-five years hence Utah’s executive branch will again be in a  state of 
chaos, incapable of management.
V. C o n c l u s i o n
The executive article of U tah’s constitution creates a  feeble institution 
to carry out the duties of managing the expenditure of over 300 million 
dollars annually and meet the political, social, and cultural responsibilities 
demanded of the executive branch of a  modem state government The 
source of executive branch weakness is a  constitutionally imposed disunity 
through the liberal use of internal checks and balances on gubernatorial 
power. The drafters of the federal constitution were well aware of the 
crippling effects constitutional disunity could have upon good government. 
Hamilton’s famous analysis in  T he Federalist Papers of the need for a  strong 
chief executive in the federal government stands today as perhaps the most
111 N a t i o n a l  M u n ic ip a l  L e a g u e ,  M o d e l  S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  § 5.06 (6 th  ed. 
1963). T he M odel provision suggests twenty as the optimum num ber of agencies 
exclusive of quasi-judicial agencies.
A l a s k a  C o n s t , a r t .  I l l ,  § 22.
H a w a i i  C o n s t ,  art. IV , § 6.
121 M a s s .  C o n s t ,  ch. V I. a r t .  L X V I.
131 M ic h .  C o n s t ,  a r t .  V, § 2.
121 N .J. C o n s t , a r t  V, § IV , para. 1.
323 N.Y. C o n s t ,  a r t  V , §§ 1-5.
151 T he Second Special Session of the Thirty-sixth Legislature passed a  jo in t resolu­
tion, H .J. Res. 3, U tah  Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1966, ch. 20, a t 29, accepting the report of 
the L ittle Hoover Commission, b u t refused to  endorse or condemn the proposals of the 
commission. T he resolution does endorse executive consolidation within the existing 
framework consistent w ith the constitution and laws on the books. Unless more affirma­
tive action is taken by the Thirty-seventh Legislature, reorganization will be doomed 
to  political bickering.
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succinct criticism of the scheme created by nineteenth century state constitu­
tions to prevent centralized executive control. Hamilton observed:
There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a  vigorous 
executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. . . . 
Energy in the executive is a  leading character in the definition of 
good government. I t  is essential to die protection of the community 
against foreign attacks: I t  is not less essential to the steady admin­
istration of the laws, to the protection of property against those irregu­
lar and high handed combinations, which sometimes interrupt the 
ordinary course of justice, to the security of liberty against the enter­
prises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy. . . .
A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government.
A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution: And a 
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in 
practice a bad government.
The ingredients, which constitute energy in the executive, are first 
unity, secondly duration, thirdly an adequate provision for its support, 
fourthly competent powers.125
The key “ingredients” missing in U tah’s executive article are “unity” 
and “competent powers.” The consequences are obvious. Reform of the 
executive article of U tah’s constitution is imperative if the recommendations 
of the Little Hoover Commission are to have any lasting impact, if U tah’s 
government is to fulfill the demands of her citizens, and if Utah is to play 
a vital role in the continual evolution of the federal-state partnership.
But it is doubtful whether adequate and intelligent constitutional reform 
can be carried out by the piecemeal process of constitutional amendments. 
The longer one studies the U tah constitution the more obvious becomes the 
need for total constitutional revision by the convention process. The present 
constitution is so complex and interdependent, that intelligent rewriting of 
the executive article can only be done in the context of total revision of the 
entire document. For example, before the legislature was willing to pass the 
proposed amendment abolishing the board of examiners it passed five 
amendments strengthening the legislative article to offset increased centraliza­
tion of executive power. But none of the amendments could be carefully 
weighed as integral parts of the overall document, with the result that an 
integrated and balanced document becomes even farther out of reach.120
However, efforts to update and strengthen state government, even though 
short of necessary reforms, deserve support. I t  is hoped that abolition of 
the board of examiners is the first short step toward the total revision of 
U tah’s executive branch that must be done in the context of a constitutional 
convention if a workable and understandable state constitution is to govern 
U tah in the future.
12S T h e  F e d e r a l i s t  No. 70, a t 471—72 (Cooke ed. 1961) (H am ilton).
128 For example, the constitutional powers of the U tah  State Board of Education 
under article X , § 8, of the U tah  constitution may well have to  be relitigated since the 
abolition of the board of examiners renders past opinions interpreting this section of 
little value. See Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 U tah  2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958);  
State Bd. of Educ. v. Commissioner of Fin., 122 U tah  164, 247 P.2d 435 (1952).
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